Personal Agent Protocol report
ax-air.com
Ora found no poppy.json at ax-air.com/.well-known/poppy.json, so every check Ora runs today reads N/A.- Verdict
- No PAP file yet
- Profile
- pap-0.1@2026-10-09PAP Draft 0.1 (published 2026-10-09; may change)
- Last run
- Tier 1 probed
- Not probed
Tier 0: the public files
Plain reads of poppy.json and the documents it points to. None of these requests carries a credential.30 N/A- T0-01Document existsNo poppy.json: HTTP 404
- T0-02Redirects safe
- T0-03Valid JSON object
- T0-04Supported protocol_version
- T0-05Organization matches the requested host
- T0-06Has an interface
- T0-07auth.issuer when needed
- T0-08All URLs HTTPS
- T0-SIBPublished on the requested host
- T0-09Issuer metadata reachable
- T0-10Issuer match
- T0-11Domain binding
- T0-12Required endpoints
- T0-21Cache headers
- ADV-PKCENo plain PKCE
- T0-13Scopes defined
- T0-14Mediated sign-in well formed
- T0-19Extensions named correctly
- T0-20Operations advertised fully
- T0-15Conversation entries
- T0-16API entries
- T0-17OpenAPI parses
- T0-18MCP resource metadata
- X-01Same MCP server everywhere
- X-02Same organization
- X-04Domains covered
- X-07One issuer
- X-08One metadata document
- X-10Shared token endpoint lists both protocols' grants
- X-12Consistent 401s
Tier 1: junk requests to the listed endpoints
Requests with no valid credential, which a correct site refuses. They run only when the scan asks for them, at most once per domain every 6 hours.No Tier 1 probe result from the last 30 days.7 N/A- T1-01Token endpoint rejects a junk JWT bearer request
- T1-02Error bodies leak nothing
- T1-03Conversation endpoint requires DPoP
- T1-05MCP server challenges unauthenticated initialize
- T1-07Browser endpoint rejects a junk assertion
- T1-09Operations endpoint requires a token
- ADV-REDIRECTEndpoint answers without a redirect
Tier 2a: coming soon
Valid requests with a real client, once Ora publishes its own client metadata and signs real requests. Not measured yet.10 not measuredShow the 10 planned checks
- T2-M1Call each read-only OpenAPI GET with no token, then with a valid signed-out token
- T2-M5Load the consent page for Ora's real client_id from a valid S256 request and inspect headers; never sign in
- T2-01Start a Session for U1
- T2-02Token lifetime
- T2-05Renew with session_id
- T2-14Nonce challenge
- T2-16Bearer token request for an MCP server (no DPoP, resource = MCP url)
- T2-18Token accepted without cookies
- T2-19Valid browser assertion, form POST
- T2-25Cookie scope
Tier 2b: requires opt-in
Checks that run only for a verified owner who opts in. Not measured yet.36 not measuredShow the 36 planned checks
- T2-M2Send a valid Session Token in ?access_token= instead of the header
- T2-M3Send a valid browser assertion in the URL instead of the form body
- T2-M4Start Direct Sign-In with code_challenge_method=plain and Ora's real client_id; stop at the authorization endpoint
- T1-12Mediated endpoint, only if the company opts in: two bad-credential attempts
- T2-03Replay the same assertion jti
- T2-04Assertion with aud as an array or another endpoint
- T2-06Renew U1's Session with a U2 assertion
- T2-07Assertion signed with a key not in Ora's JWKS
- T2-08alg: none or HS256 assertion
- T2-09Valid token, reused proof jti
- T2-10Proof with wrong htu or htm
- T2-11Proof with wrong ath
- T2-12Proof signed by a different key than the token's binding
- T2-13Stale iat (beyond ~1 min)
- T2-15Token sent as Authorization: Bearer to a non-MCP endpoint
- T2-17That Bearer token at another MCP server or an OpenAPI endpoint
- T2-20Replay the same browser assertion
- T2-21exp more than 60 s after iat
- T2-22return_to on a foreign domain
- T2-23Session assertion (wrong typ) at the browser endpoint
- T2-24Browser assertion at the token endpoint
- T2-26Start with a general question
- T2-27Retry the same message id and content
- T2-28Same id, different content
- T2-29Read events with and without wait
- T2-30POST …/messages?wait=10
- T2-31Junk cursor
- T2-32U2 reads U1's conversation
- T2-33Stream with Accept: text/event-stream
- T2-34Ask about the account while signed out
- T2-35Message with only context
- T2-36Close, then send a message
- T2-37Handoff (opt-in only; may page staff)
- T2-38Ora client metadata without extensions.operations, trigger a proposing endpoint
- T2-39U2 reads U1's signed-out operation
- T2-40Confirm an old revision (if revisions can be triggered)
Tier 3: needs a test account and a person
Checks that need a test account from the company and a person at the keyboard. Ora does not run these on its own.17 not measuredShow the 17 planned checks
- T3-01Direct sign-in
- T3-02Redirect URI not in Ora's redirect_uris
- T3-03User declines
- T3-04Device sign-in
- T3-05Mediated sign-in (if offered)
- T3-06Partial scope approval
- T3-07Request an unlisted scope
- T3-08Scope enforcement across channels
- T3-09Account Token from another client_id or at an API
- T3-10Account Token with narrower and wider scope
- T3-11Sign a Session into account B after account A
- T3-12Revoke the Account Token
- T3-13Signed-out token on an account-using conversation
- T3-14Direct Conversation
- T3-15Operation end to end (sandbox action)
- T3-16standing_permission on a user_approval_required operation
- T3-17Account settings